Analysis of the causes of bridge crane accidents and safety management
橋式起重機(jī)事故原因分析及安全管理
Analysis of the causes of bridge crane accidents and safety management
引發(fā)橋式起重機(jī)起重吊運(yùn)作業(yè)事故主要危險(xiǎn)因素有:未發(fā)信號(hào),使用不合格吊具超載吊運(yùn),安全防護(hù)裝置失靈,指揮信號(hào)不明或亂指揮,吊物捆綁不牢,歪拉斜掛吊運(yùn),棱角快口沒(méi)有襯墊等。在對(duì)314起起重機(jī)事故按機(jī)型分類(lèi)的統(tǒng)計(jì)中,橋式起重機(jī)發(fā)生事故數(shù)量是59起,所占比例為18.8%,事故發(fā)生率是所有起重機(jī)械里面最高的。因此必須加強(qiáng)對(duì)起重作業(yè)人員的安全操作規(guī)程和規(guī)章制度教育,提高起重作業(yè)人員的安全素質(zhì)。
Cause of bridge crane hoisting and lifting operation accident risk factors: no signal, the use of substandard hoist overload lifting, safety protection device failure, the command signal is unknown or arbitrary command, hanging binding is not strong, crooked pull over the lifting, angular openings no liner etc.. In 314 crane accidents according to statistical models classification, bridge crane accident number is 59, the proportion of 18.8%, the accident rate is the highest of all hoisting machinery. It is necessary to strengthen the operation rules and regulations on safety education for lifting personnel, improve the safety quality of lifting operation personnel.
1起重機(jī)的機(jī)械事故
1 crane machine accidents
起重傷害與事故是指起重機(jī)械在作業(yè)過(guò)程中,由機(jī)具、吊物等所引起的人身傷亡或設(shè)備損壞事故。據(jù)統(tǒng)計(jì),在冶金、機(jī)電、鐵路、港口、建筑等生產(chǎn)部門(mén),起重機(jī)械所發(fā)生的事故占有很大比例,高達(dá)25%左右,其中死亡事故占15%左右。如表1所示,其中在吊具打擊中,有3起脫鉤事故,占吊具打擊事故的50%;在斷繩事故中,有5起過(guò)卷事故,占斷繩事故的38.5%;在108起事故中,有2起是超載事故,占事故總數(shù)的1.9%。據(jù)統(tǒng)計(jì)結(jié)果可知,在108起典型起重傷害事故中,吊物脫落打擊事故占總事故數(shù)的25%,其傷亡人數(shù)占總傷亡人數(shù)的20.7%,居首位;其次是斷繩傷害事故,分別為12%和12.1%;居第3位的是擠壓傷害事故,分別為12%和9.3%。由此可見(jiàn),吊物脫落打擊、斷繩和擠壓傷害事故是起重機(jī)械作業(yè)過(guò)程中的多發(fā)性事故。
Lifting injury and accident refers to the hoisting machinery in the process of the operation, caused by a machine, hanging, personal injury or equipment damage accidents. According to statistics, in metallurgy, machinery, railway, port, building the production department, the occurrence of heavy machinery accident occupies a large proportion, as high as 25%, which accounted for about 15% of deaths. As shown in Table 1, which in the sling blow, 3 blow from accidents, accounting for 50% of accident in a sling; rope break accident, there are 5 overwinding accident, accounting for rope-broken accident of 38.5%; in 108 cases, 2 were overload accident, accounting for 1.9% of the total number of accidents. According to the statistical results, in 108 typical lifting injury accident, hanging off against accidents accounted for the total number of accidents 25%, the death toll accounts for the total of 20.7% casualties, the first; followed by the rope break accident, respectively 12% and 12.1%; ranked third is crush injury accident, respectively. 12% and 9.3%. Thus, the hanging off the blow, rope and crush injury is the hoisting machinery in the process of operation of multiple accidents.
2橋式起重機(jī)重大事故的分析
Analysis of 2 major accidents of bridge crane
事故樹(shù)分析又稱(chēng)為故障樹(shù)分析或事故邏輯分析,它是對(duì)系統(tǒng)安全性進(jìn)行定性與定量分析評(píng)價(jià)的一種科學(xué)的和先進(jìn)的方法,已被廣泛地運(yùn)用到現(xiàn)代設(shè)計(jì)的多個(gè)領(lǐng)域之中。事故樹(shù)分析評(píng)價(jià)是運(yùn)用由事件符號(hào)和邏輯符號(hào)組成的一種圖形模式,來(lái)分析人機(jī)系統(tǒng)中導(dǎo)致災(zāi)害事故的各種因素之間的因果關(guān)系和邏輯關(guān)系,從而判明系統(tǒng)運(yùn)行當(dāng)中,各種事故發(fā)生的途徑和重點(diǎn)環(huán)節(jié),為有效地控制,提供一個(gè)簡(jiǎn)潔而形象的途徑。在作業(yè)過(guò)程中,由于人的失誤、機(jī)器故障、環(huán)境影響,隨時(shí)都有可能發(fā)生不同程度的事故。為了不使這些事故導(dǎo)致災(zāi)害性后果就要對(duì)系統(tǒng)中可能發(fā)生事故的各種不安全因素進(jìn)行分析和預(yù)測(cè),以采取相應(yīng)的措施和手段來(lái)防止和消除危險(xiǎn)。因此一個(gè)系統(tǒng)的事故分析應(yīng)包括:系統(tǒng)可能發(fā)生災(zāi)害事故,也稱(chēng)為頂上事件;系統(tǒng)內(nèi)固有的或潛在的事故因素,包括人、機(jī)器、環(huán)境因素;各個(gè)子系統(tǒng)及各因素之間的相互聯(lián)系與制約關(guān)系,即輸入—輸出的因果邏輯關(guān)系,并用專(zhuān)門(mén)的符號(hào)表示;計(jì)算系統(tǒng)的頂上事件的發(fā)生概率,進(jìn)行定量分析與評(píng)價(jià)。
Fault tree analysis and analysis of fault tree analysis or accident logic, it is for the qualitative and quantitative analysis and evaluation of the security of the system is a scientific and advanced method, has been widely applied to many fields of modern design. Fault tree analysis evaluation is the use of a graphical model consisting of event symbols and symbolic logic, to analyze the causation and the logical relationship between the various factors causing disasters in man-machine system, so as to ascertain the system operation, approach and key links of various accidents, in order to effectively control, provides a concise and vivid the way. In the course of the operation, due to errors, machine failure, environment influence people, may occur at any time of the accident. In order not to make these accidents lead to disastrous consequences will be unsafe for the various possible accident system of factor analysis and prediction, to take corresponding measures and means to prevent and eliminate the risk of. Therefore, a systematic analysis of accident should include: the system may occur accident, also known as the top event; factors in the system inherent or potential accidents, including man, machine, environment factors; between each subsystem and each factor mutual connection and restriction, namely the input - output of the causal relation, and is represented by special symbols; the happening probability of the top event system, analysis and quantitative evaluation.
2.1事故樹(shù)分析程序
把事故樹(shù)的分析過(guò)程采用1個(gè)系統(tǒng)圖形建立起來(lái),如圖1所示。
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2.2事故樹(shù)的建立
2.2.1建立事故樹(shù)圖
頂上事件:吊物擠、撞打擊傷害。吊車(chē)事故圖見(jiàn)圖2。
2.2.2事故樹(shù)分析
事故樹(shù)的割集:
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事故樹(shù)的徑集:
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2.3結(jié)構(gòu)重要度計(jì)算
導(dǎo)致頂事件發(fā)生的基本事件很多,在采取防止頂事件發(fā)生措施時(shí)應(yīng)該分清輕重緩急,優(yōu)先解決那些比較重要的問(wèn)題,首先消除或控制那些對(duì)頂事件影響重大的基本事件。在故障樹(shù)分析中,用基本事件重要度來(lái)衡量某一基本事件對(duì)頂事件影響的大小?;臼录慕Y(jié)構(gòu)重要度取決它們?cè)诠收蠘?shù)結(jié)構(gòu)中的位置。評(píng)價(jià)基本事件結(jié)構(gòu)重要度的方法:根據(jù)基本事件在最小割集中出現(xiàn)的情況評(píng)價(jià)在由較少基本事件組成的最小割集合中出現(xiàn)的基本事件,其結(jié)構(gòu)重要度較大;在不同最小割集合中出現(xiàn)次數(shù)多基本事件,其結(jié)構(gòu)重要度大。可按下式計(jì)算第1個(gè)基本事件的結(jié)構(gòu)重要度:
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式中k——故障樹(shù)包含的最小割集數(shù)目;
m——包含第i個(gè)基本事件的最小割集數(shù)目;
Rj——包含第i個(gè)基本事件的第j個(gè)最小割集中基本事件的數(shù)目。
采用事故樹(shù)分析軟件得出該事故樹(shù)的結(jié)構(gòu)重要度順序?yàn)椋?/div>
I(17)>I(14)=I(15)=I(16)>I(8)=I(12)=I(6)=I
(7)=I(9)=I(10)=I(11)=I(13)=I(2)=I(3)=I(4)=I